Foreign policymakers and analysts intone “autonomy” for the Russian-occupied Donbas enclave with tedious regularity, almost as if they were in possession of some magic formula. One of the latest to join the chorus was NATO General Secretary 

In fact, invocation of autonomy is at best an evasion, at worst meaningless.

For starters, the Donbas, like Crimea, effectively enjoyed vast autonomy since Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Local political elites—their latest manifestation was Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions—ruled Luhansk and Donetsk provinces in cahoots with organized crime and oligarchs, foremost among them being the multibillionaire Rinat Akhmetov. Kyiv had almost nothing to say about their political, economic, and social policies. Russian language and culture reigned supreme, while Ukrainian language and culture were absent from the public realm, a fact that pro-autonomy proponents of “protecting” Russian from nonexistent Ukrainian “nationalist” assaults conveniently overlook.

In any case, while more regional autonomy is a good idea for all of Ukraine, the Donbas actually weakens the case for decentralization, suggesting that it leads to the formation of regional clans that exploit people, steal like mad, whip up chauvinist passions, and promote war for their own nefarious ends.
But the main reason for viewing autonomy as a bogus solution for the occupied Donbas enclave is that it means completely different things for the parties involved—Kyiv and the separatists. Implementation of the Minsk accords has made little progress beyond the ratty cease-fire, partly because the separatists and Russia violated the agreement from day one and mostly because there is no way that Kyiv and the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” can agree.
Understandably, Kyiv insists on the region’s de-militarization and on fair and free elections to determine who will run things. To agree to anything less would be to abandon all pretense of Ukraine’s statehood and sovereignty. After all, states are supposed to have a monopoly of violence; they cannot countenance the presence on their territory of armed militias. By the same token, sovereignty means that states set the rules according to which elites and sub-elites are chosen. Kyiv has stated that, if the current separatists are elected in fair and free elections, it would recognize them. But for sovereignty to have any content, Kyiv must insist on elections held according to its rules.
No less understandably, the separatists insist on retaining their militias and on remaining in power—demands that are diametrically opposed to, and irreconcilable with, Kyiv’s minimal requirements. To make matters worse, Vladimir Putin’s proxies simultaneously maintain that they are already independent and that they would be happy to remain within Ukraine’s fold under maximally autonomous conditions. That’s nonsense: you cannot be independent and not independent at the same time.
How can this circle be squared?

It can’t. Kyiv must insist that Ukraine is a sovereign state, while the separatists must insist on remaining in power. Which is why I’ve been suggesting with no less tedious regularity that Ukraine would do well to freeze the conflict and let the enclave drift away. That way, Ukraine doesn’t recognize the people’s republics, while effectively enabling the separatists to run them into the ground, with, presumably, minimal negative effects for Ukraine proper. This won’t stop the fighting, at least not immediately. Even though Kyiv rejects using force to win back the enclave, Russia’s proxies still say they have the right to “liberate” at least all of the Donbas. Over time, however, the continued decay of the enclave will, or should, erode the separatists’ war-fighting ability. In any case, since Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov believes the enclave should be part of Ukraine, we can be certain that keeping it out is the right thing to do.

Of course, mine is a halfway measure. If Kyiv were bold, it would countenance giving the occupied territories the independence that its separatist leaders say they want or have. Think about it. If Kyiv took the initiative, it could, in one fell swoop, establish clarity in its east. If the enclave were independent, all talk of “civil war,” autonomy, and “economic blockades” would cease, and the only issue would be the Russian war against Ukraine proper. The West would be happy to see the problem of the Donbas go away, and, with the conflict reduced to its stark Russo-Ukrainian dimension, a diplomatic solution might actually be easier to find. In the meantime, Ukraine and the enclave could establish whichever relations they like, but only if both sides found them mutually profitable.
Sounds great, except that this approach would outrage Ukraine’s hyper-patriots and the pro-Kyiv eastern Ukrainians who’ve been fighting for their homeland in the Donbas. Populist mobilization and popular discontent could even lead to a march on Kyiv or, heaven forbid, a third Maidan.
So are we back to square one or might this particular circle be squared?
A prominent democratic western Ukrainian policymaker, the 50-year-old Taras Stetskiv, has recently suggested just how the impossible might happen. He recommends holding a binding plebiscite in the occupied territories, with the choices being unification with Ukraine or independence. But here’s the rub. Even though chances are the enclave would opt for independence, it’s not at all clear that the separatists would let the ballot go ahead. After all, to do so would be to accept Kyiv’s rules, which they reject a priori.
And that brings us back to square one: keeping the enclave at arm’s length (and, as a side benefit, poking Lavrov in the eye). In time, the separatist-controlled territory is likely to acquire the accoutrements of independence, while Ukraine, bathed in blissful indifference to the enclave, continues on its path toward the West. A few years from now, “autonomy” would be moot, as Ukraine and the enclave will have drifted so far apart as to exist in different worlds. Sort of like Putin and the West.

Ukraine Should Abandon the Donbas Enclave

 

Ukraine has two nonnegotiable priorities in its ongoing war with Russia: survival and reform. Ukraine must survive as a sovereign democratic state in the short term if it is to reform, and it must reform itself in the medium term in order to survive and become a prosperous and secure sovereign democratic state in the long term. Both goals can be best advanced if Ukraine washes its hands of the enclave of the Donbas region that Russia and its proxies now control.

Europe’s foremost priority is inextricably connected to Ukraine’s. Europe’s two key pillars—the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—must survive as effective institutions, but they can do so only if Ukraine survives and reforms. If Ukraine, a geopolitically pivotal country in the heart of Europe, falls to Russia or becomes a European Zimbabwe, Europe will be hard-pressed to remain functional, prosperous, and stable.
Ukraine’s priorities are, therefore, Europe’s—and by extension America’s. The only difference—and the only source of policy disagreement—is on the time frame. Ukraine needs to survive immediately, and it must reform itself as soon as possible. If it fails to do so, Europe’s survival will come into question, but only in time—a prospect that enables some Europeans to hope that things will somehow work themselves out in the future.
Ukraine’s survival is predicated on one simple goal: stopping Putin.
Stopping Putin means two things. First, the West cannot abate its sanctions or recognize Russia’s illegal occupation of the Crimea and the Donbas. If sanctions are rolled back and the occupations are deemed legal, Putin will be told that imperialism pays. No one knows what he wants, but it’s clear that his minimal goal is to keep Ukraine unstable, poor, and on the verge of collapse. His maximal goal may be all of Ukraine or, as he told Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko, “If I want to, Russian troops can be not only in Kyiv in two days, but also in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw, or Bucharest.”
Second, Ukraine must have the defensive capacity to deter a further Russian invasion. Kyiv has already adopted a plan to build extensive fortifications along its border with Russia and the Donbas enclave. Ukraine must now do everything possible—preferably with Western help—to strengthen its army and acquire the force structure it needs to stop Russian tanks and aircraft. Since vast amounts of Western military assistance are unlikely, the burden of security will fall on Ukraine, which will be able to sustain it only if its economy begins to grow briskly.
Ukraine’s adoption of painful systemic reforms requires political will on the part of the political elite, a willingness by the population to endure hardship, and a clear road map. For the first time since independence in 1991, all three components are in place. The post-Maidan democrats understand that reform is unavoidable; the vast majority of Ukrainians want change and know that reform can make life only marginally worse; and the EU Association Agreement provides Ukraine with a clear vision of the concrete steps it must take.
But systemic reform will be next to impossible if Kyiv’s attention and resources remain focused on the Donbas enclave. Under the worst-case scenario, if fighting continues or intensifies, increasingly scarce resources will flow eastward and reform will be delayed until peace finally comes. Under the best-case scenario, if some form of peace arrives and holds, while Kyiv continues to devote its attention to integrating and, ultimately, financing the reconstruction of the region, reforms will be tabled because the Donbas enclave will, as Putin knows, obstruct westward-oriented change and promote Russian influence in Ukraine’s internal affairs.
The enclave’s population has been and may still be unremittingly anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western. Its elites—whether the old guard in the Party of Regions and the Communist Party or the new guard in the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics—are political and economic reactionaries. The enclave’s chief oligarch and corruptioneer, Rinat Akhmetov, is still uncertain about his loyalty to Kyiv. And the enormous economic and human destruction wrought by Russia and its proxies will require massive amounts of subsidies that Kyiv can obtain only by raiding the coffers of Ukraine’s other provinces.
In sum, reintegrating the Donbas enclave into Ukraine will retard and prevent reform and, thus, undermine Ukraine’s survival. In contrast, keeping it at arm’s length will free Ukraine to pursue reform and consolidate its sovereignty.
There are several ways in which “keeping it at arm’s length” may be interpreted. Ukraine could cut the enclave loose and tell it to determine its own future. It could, as Poroshenko’s current peace plan does, grant them a special status within Ukraine that effectively amounts to independence, especially if Russia’s proxies run the enclave. Or Ukraine could “freeze” the status quo, turn inward and westward, and “wash its hands” of the region.
Whatever Ukraine’s choice, it—and the West—must understand that their future ultimately hinges on what happens to the enclave. The Donbas was probably the single most important obstacle to Ukraine’s adoption of reforms in the last 23 years. It would be a tragedy if, through Kyiv’s and the West’s unwillingness to recognize Ukraine’s priorities, the enclave continued to play this dubious role in the future.